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CURRENT ISSUES
THE PATTERN REQUIREMENT OF
CIVIL RICO: "ENTERPRISE" AS A
MEANS TO END THE CONFUSION
'The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act"
(RICO), enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970,' "was designed in a multifaceted campaign against the per-
vasive presence of organized crime infiltrated in American busi-
ness and trade." s Section 1962 makes it unlawful for "any per-
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 and 28 U.S.C.). For a detailed account of the legislative history of RICO, see Blakey,
The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context. Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoaRE DAME L
REV. 237, 249-80 (1982). The RICO legislation was purposefully extended beyond tradi-
tional "organized crime" to provide civil relief to "[bloth immediate victims of racketeer-
ing activity and competing organizations." Id. at 280.
The title and acronym of the Act has been the subject of some comment. Paries v.
Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21 n.1 (N.D. II1. 1982). The person who
christened the statute may have been a "movie buff with a sense of humor" because in the
first Hollywood gangster movie of the 1930's "Little Caesar", Edward G. Robinson played
an Al Capone-type character named Rico. Id.
' Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 20 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing district court opin-
ion at 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). See also Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-
23 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose for enactment of RICO). See generally RE-
PORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FOaC OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANK-
ING AND BUSINEss LAW 55 (1985); Abrams, The Civil RICO Controversy Reaches the Supreme
Court, 13 HorsTRA L. REV. 147 (1984) (analyzes Supreme Court's Sedima decision and ex-
amines alternative methods of limiting scope of RICO); Black, Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations (RICO) - Securities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime After
Sedima: What is a "Pattern of Racketeering Activity"?, 6 PACE L. REv. 365 (1986) (examines
how courts have interpreted RICO after Sedima); Blakey, supra note 2 (advocates liberal
and expansive use of civil RICO); Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery,
49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980) (availability of RICO as prosecutorial tool); Note, Civil
RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restrictions, 95 HARv. L REv. 1101 (1982);
Note, Congress Responds to Sedima: Is There a Contract Out on Civil RICO?, 19 Loy. LAL
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 3: 1, 1987
son" to use money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity
to invest in an enterprise, to acquire control of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, or to conduct an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity.' Section 1964(c)
provides that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962" may bring a federal action5
and if successful, "shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains" and his attorney's fees.
The availability of treble damages and attorneys' fees has
proved very attractive to plaintiffs and has led to a significant in-
crease in the number of civil RICO suits being brought today. In
REv. 851 (1986) (examination of proposed RICO legislation) [hereinafter Note, Congress
Responds]; Note, RICO: Limiting Suits by Altering the Pattern, 28 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 177
(1986) (analyzes purpose and effect of the pattern requirement).
For a discussion of the criminal penalties under RICO, see generally 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(1982); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Basic Con-
cepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMp. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures,
Forfeitable "Interests", and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REv. 57 (1983) (discussion of
provisions for in personam forfeiture); Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 - RICO's
Most Powerful Weapon, 17 Am. Can. L. R.Ev. 379 (1980).
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1982).
* 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Section 1965 of RICO provides that venue of any civil
action may be laid in "any district in which . . . [the defendant] resides, is found, has an
agent, or transacts his affairs." 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1982).
Although RICO confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to entertain civil RICO
actions, it does not state whether such jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent with state
courts. See, e.g., Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 916, 710 P.2d 375, 382, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 575, 581-82 (1985) ("concurrent jurisdiction is consistent with ... Congress's ex-
pressed mandate that RICO 'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes' ").
* 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Civil actions may be brought by the Attorney General and
by private citizens. Id. § 1964 (b)-(c). See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1047. The civil
sanctions to the defendant include "divestment, injunctive relief, [and] dissolution of the
racketeering enterprise .... Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer: The Need for Criminal Proce-
dural Protections in Actions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1290 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer].
I See Black, supra note 3, at 366. The generous remedy provisions enunciated by RICO
have recently become appreciated for their value and thereby more frequently utilized. Id.
Consequently, suits which previously would have disregarded the RICO statute now are
adding RICO violations to their claims. See, e.g., Banker& Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1984) (RICO violation claimed in case of bankruptcy fraud); Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (stock traders who obtained non-public informa-
tion had duty to disclose), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
Many have traced the increase in civil RICO actions to an article co-authored by Robert
Blakey, the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee which proposed RICO. Blakey &
Gettings, supra note 3, at 1012. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486-87
(2d Cir. 1984) (advocated liberal interpretation of RICO), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). It
was contended by Senator Hruska that the value of Title IX "may well be found to exist in
its civil provisions." 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970).
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order to avoid federalization of state common law fraud claims8
and to curtail the labeling of legitimate businesses as "racke-
Furthermore, another attraction of a RICO claim is that it affords plaintiff a federal
forum. See Black, supra note 3, at 366 n.6. It allows a new private cause of action for a
number of federal crimes which heretofore did not exist, and it may broaden the "scope of
discovery." Id.
It was reported in Sedima that: "Of 270 district court RICO decisions prior to this year,
only 3% (nine cases) were decided throughout the 1970's, 2% were decided in 1980, 7% in
1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481 n.l (citing
Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Bank-
ing and Business Law 55 (1985)).
Instead of using the RICO statute against mobsters to collect damages, the statute has
surprisingly led to claims against honorable and lawful "enterprises." See Sedima, 741 F.2d
at 487. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1986)
(plaintiff successful in RICO claim against accounting firm); Rojas v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
613 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (unsuccessful attempt by physician to bring RICO action
against bank); Alberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1984) (plaintiff
unsuccessfully sought to bring a RICO claim against a brokerage house).
Most of the civil RICO suits have been aimed at large legitimate corporations in the
financial services industry. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71
MINN. L. REV. 827, 828 n.5 (1987) (sample listing of major corporations that have used
RICO civil provisions, with emphasis on a civil RICO suit brought by IBM that resulted in
a .multi-million dollar settlement) (citing Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the
Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 411 (1986)).
.Not all commentators have welcomed the increase in civil RICO litigation. See Lacovara
& Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People: The Runaway Provisions of Pri-
vate Civil RICO, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1985) (civil RICO suits distort congressional
intent and cause needless prosecutions); Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer, supra note 6, at
1290 (RICO's civil provisions are punitive in effect and criminal in nature and as such
require criminal procedural protections). However, such concerns for misuse of the Act
may be unfounded. Cf Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context,
1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55 (1986). The study noted:
It is apparent... that the abuse issue has been exaggerated and that, to the extent
abuse has occurred, the system has handled the problem effectively and expedi-
tiously. For example, congressional witnesses have often broadly referred to "RICO
horror stories" without providing supporting documentation. And, to the extent
specific examples of abuse have been provided, most, in fact, were dismissed at the
pleading stage. The remainder were for the most part proper RICO claims raising
serious allegations of enterprise criminality and commercial fraud.
Id. at 69-70. See also Note, Congress Responds, supra note 3, at 859 (authors noted that of
nearly three-hundred civil RICO suits surveyed by ABA Task Force as of March 1985,
only nine resulted in treble damage awards).
These criticisms of the broad treble damages provision have spurred some congressional
response. See S. 2907, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D. Ohio)
introduced a bill wherein treble damages would have been awarded only as a punitive mea-
sure but it failed passage by only three votes in the 99th Congress. Nat'l L.J., Nov. 2, 1987,
at 36, col. 3. The proposal also gave consumers broader power to sue. Id. Proponents of
the removal of the treble damage provisions contend this would eliminate the incentive for
abusive litigation. Id. It is likely that the issue will resurrect itself in the very near future,
especially in view of the close vote on this bill. Id.
8 See Note, Civil RICO and "Garden Variety" Fraud - A Suggested Analysis, 58 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 93, 95 (1983) (suggests limiting RICO securities fraud actions).
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teers,"' many lower federal courts created artificial hurdles for
plaintiffs. For example, courts required plaintiffs to prove an or-
ganized crime connection,' a racketeering injury," a prior crimi-
nal conviction" or a competitive injury. 13 Two of these court-im-
posed hurdles, the racketeering injury and prior conviction
requirements, were struck down by the Supreme Court in Sedima,
S.P.R.L.,v. Imrex Co." as contrary to the language and intent of
9 See Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (to permit plaintiff to
file RICO claim "would add credence to an inference that defendant is somehow involved
in organized crime"); Lewin, Racketeering Law's Fallout, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1983, at Dl,
col. 1 (RICO charges carry an "emotional ... wallop").
10 See Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (civil ac-
tions based on federal securities law must entail some relation to organized crime); Water-
man S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981) ("[T]he
history of the statute reveals a clearly expressed legislative intent that RICO should apply
only to actions involving organized crime activities, and not to everyday civil actions ...
."); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. III. 1981) (no
justification for resort to civil RICO action where no link to organized crime can be
proven). For a thorough examination of judicial attempts to limit civil RICO actions, see
Abrams, supra note 3, at 154-59. Judicial attempts to require the connection of organized
crime with civil RICO actions have been unsuccessful. Id. Since the language of RICO does
not entail such a requirement, the courts are unwilling to impose it. Id. Furthermore, the
status or association questions this analysis would entail are unconstitutional. Id. See gener-
ally Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c) Conflicting Precedent and the
Practitioner's Dilemina, 57 Tump. L.Q. 731, 746-67 (1984) (discussion of the requirement of
proving a competitive or organized crime connection).
11 See Moran, supra note 10, at 756. The requirement of a racketeering injury is the
"most popular and frequently invoked limitation." Id. This limitation requires the plaintiff
to "suffer an injury that is different from the harm arising from the underlying predicate
offenses." Id. See King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("state law
claims are not properly converted into federal treble damage actions by simply alleging
that wrongful acts are a pattern of racketeering related to an enterprise ... [without addi-
tional allegations that there was] injury resulting from the purported RICO violations.");
Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 718-19 (D.D.C. 1983) (plaintiffs must prove a RICO
injury and furthermore, it must be an injury that RICO was intended to prevent).
10 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496. The Second Circuit opinion in Sedina held that a criminal
conviction was required before a civil RICO action could be maintained. Id. at 496-97.
", See United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977). The purpose of section 1964(c) was to prevent
interference with free competition. Id. at 720. Because both RICO and section 4 of the
Clayton Act provided for recovery of treble damages and attorney fees, several of the
lower courts had limited standing in civil RICO suits to those plaintiffs who could demon-
strate a competitive injury. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235,
1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court held it was "appropriate to limit the extraordinary private
remedy . . . to [those] who have suffered a competitive injury .... "); North Barrington
Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. il. 1980) (plaintiff was required to
allege how he was injured competitively by the RICO violation).
" 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Sedima marked the first time the Supreme Court examined a
civil RICO action. Id. The two earlier RICO cases examined by the Court were criminal
cases. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27-28 (1983) (purpose of RICO statute
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the RICO statute.1 5 Nevertheless, the Sedima Court did suggest in
a now famous footnote" that courts had overlooked the "pattern"
requirement of the RICO statute as a means of limiting the num-
was to provide innovative measures to stop organized crime); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981) (scope of RICO suits was to encompass both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises).
" Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493. The Court stated that the judicially set out requirements
were inconsistent with "Congress' underlying policy concerns." Id.
Congress' response to Sedima was in the form of a bill introduced by Congressman Fred-
erick Boucher (D. Va.) nine days after the decision. See H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); cf Note, Congress Responds, supra note 3, at 888. The proposed amendment would
codify the pre-Sedima Second Circuit's prior conviction requirement. Id. It has been sug-
gested that this bill ignores the Sedima Court's concerns that such requirements arbitrarily
limit civil RICO suits. Id. The effect is to provide relief to some and deny it to others
simply because the defendant who caused their injury did not have the requisite racketeer-
ing injury. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 490 n.9. The proposed bill further ignores the difficulty of
obtaining convictions on all counts and the potential dangers of criminal defendants plea
bargaining to non-predicate offenses to avoid civil liability. Id.
Similarly, a bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Orrin Hatch (R. Utah) which
would amend section 1964(c) to require that one of the predicate acts be an act other than
mail, wire or securities fraud. See S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). It also would limit
recovery to "competitive, investment or other business injuries" and award cost and attor-
ney fees to defendants who were victims of frivolous suits. Id. Senator Hatch's bill would
allow a business to sue, but would only allow a private person to sue if he had suffered an
injury to an investment. Id. One commentator noted that "[t]his would create the anoma-
lous result ... of denying a RICO remedy to a private person while providing for a busi-
ness suffering identical injuries." Note, Congress Responds, supra note 3, at 885.
" Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. The text of the often quoted footnote is set forth below.
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" differs from other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a pattern
"requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," § 1961(5) (emphasis added), not
that it "means" two such acts. The implication is that while two acts are necessary,
they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do not gen-
erally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports the view that two isolated
acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report ex-
plained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legit-
imate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the
threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relation-
ship which combines to produce a pattern." S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969) (em-
phasis added). Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill, after quoting this portion of
the Report, pointed out to his colleagues that "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires the
showing of a relationship .... So, therefore, proof of two acts of racketeering activ-
ity, without more, does not establish a pattern .... " 116 Cong. Rec. 18940 (1970)
(statement of Sen. McClellan). See also id., at 35193 (statement of Rep. Pofl) (RICO
"not aimed at the isolated offender"); House Hearings, at 665. Significantly, in de-
fining "pattern" in a later provision of the same bill, Congress was more enlighten-
ing: "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). This language may be useful in interpreting other
sections of the Act. Cf. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975).
Id.
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ber of suits being brought.1" In the three years since Sedima, the
circuit courts have struggled to define the element of "pattern of
racketeering activity" with inconsistent results.
Justice White, writing for the majority in Sedima, set forth the
four requirements necessary to establish a violation of section
1962(c): "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4)
of racketeering activity."1  The two key components of a RICO
action which will be analyzed are: "enterprise"'9 and "pattern of
racketeering activity."20
This Article will examine the position of several of the circuits
on the pattern requirement after the Sedima decision"' and con-
clude that the enterprise component of RICO supplies the unify-
ing link in determining whether the alleged predicate acts consti-
tute a pattern of racketeering activity.
'T Id.
19 Id. at 496. "The plaintiff must, of course, allege each of these elements to state a
claim." Id. Further, the plaintiff only has standing if he can prove injury due to the viola-
tion. Id.
-' 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1984). See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (discussion of
the enterprise component of RICO). See Note, Broadening the Scope of Civil RICO: Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 339 (1986) (purpose of RICO is to enforce prohibi-
tions and add sanctions against patterned unlawful racketeering).
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1984). See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussion of
the pattern component of RICO).
The presence of both an "enterprise" and a "pattern of racketeering activity" consti-
tutes a violation of RICO. See United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir.
1981) (essence of RICO violation is "conduct[ing] of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity"); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (Con-
gress intended enterprise to include " 'any ...group of individuals' whose association,
however loose or informal, furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predi-
cate crimes.").
" See generally Note, RICO: Limiting Suits by Altering the Pattern, 28 WM. & MARy L. REv.
177 (1986). "The term 'pattern' defies concise definition." Id. at 183. In enacting the
RICO statute, Congress should have foreseen the immense potential for abuse when no
guidelines regarding the "pattern" requirement were provided. Id. This oversight has re-
sulted in a lack of uniformity among the courts. Id. Due to the confusion after Sedima a
number of courts still did not follow the pattern guidelines set forth therein. See, e.g.,
United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985). The Qaoud court found that there
was no necessity that acts used to form the pattern be "interrelated in any way." Id. at
1116. See also Torwest D.B.C., Inc. v. Dick, 628 F. Supp. 163, 165-67 (D. Colo. 1986) (held
predicate acts only have to be related to the enterprise and not necessarily to each other).
This is in clear contradiction to the suggestion made by the Sedima Court that it is neces-
sary to show continuity and relationship to find a pattern. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
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I. ESTABLISHING A VIOLATION UNDER SECTION 1962
The enterprise element has been the easier of the two compo-
nents for the courts to interpret since Congress provided for its
definition. It includes "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of indi-
viduals associated in fact although not a legal entity."" s Labor un-
ions,"3 governmental bodies," individuals" and corporations' 6
have been held to be covered by this definition. A liberal interpre-
tation of the statute is indicated by the use of the term "enter-
prise" instead of "business" and by the absence of qualifiers
thereto. 7
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1984).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 58 (2d Cir. 1980) (union president and
vice president conducted the affairs of Local 1814 of International Longshoremen's Asso-
ciation through a pattern of racketeering activity; "enterprise" included "any union"), cer.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). See also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616 (2d Cir.
1982) (embezzlement by union official is considered "racketeering" under RICO), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 861 (7th Cir.) (receiving
of money by an employee of a labor union from an employer is a violation of RICO), cerL
denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
" See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 1000-01 (6th Cir.) (defendants
connected with Tennessee Governor's Office were found guilty since Governor's office was
an "enterprise" under RICO), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982); United States v. Kovic,
684 F.2d 512, 516 (11 th Cir.) (city police department constituted an enterprise), cert de-
nied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 31-34 (2d Cir. 1981)
(state court constituted an enterprise), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); United States v.
Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1263 (8th Cir. 1981) (enterprise includes governmental agencies or
offices). But see United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1020 (D.C. Md. 1976) (a state is
not an enterprise).
" United States v. Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 268 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("[Tlhere need be
only one individual, but he must act through an identifiable entity-in this case, through
his sole proprietorship.").
See, e.g., United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983). Congress did not
intend to limit the definition of entity to the same category of entities. Id. at 828. Corpora-
tions were meant to be included within the term "enterprise" because in drafting RICO,
Congress used the word "includes" in the enterprise definition to indicate that a non-ex-
haustive list of associations was intended. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625-26
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982). See also United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d
961, 988-89 (11 th Cir.) (corporations satisfy "enterprise" requirement), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1170, 1183 (1982); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1979)
(more than one corporation is still considered to be an enterprise), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980).
27 United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979) ("In fashioning the statute,
Congress promulgated a broad legislative scheme to encompass a variety of criminal activi-
ties, regardless of their direct effect on legitimate business."), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[AII enterprises that
are conducted through ... racketeering ... fall within the interdiction of the Act."), cert.
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The second component, a "pattern of racketeering activity,"
has provided much more controversy among the courts interpret-
ing it. It is submitted, that this can be traced to Congress' failure
to adequately define what constitutes a "pattern" within the
meaning of RICO. The statute requires "at least two acts of rack-
eteering activity"" within a ten year period." The term "racke-
teering activity" is defined in section 1961(1) as meaning the vio-
lation of any one of a group of criminal statutes detailed in that
section, but those acts most often included in a civil RICO action
involve acts of mail fraud," wire fraud8 and the fraudulent sale
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). See also United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897-98 (5th
Cir. 1978) (section 1962(c) reaches both legal and illegal organizations by the term
"enterprise").
Civil and criminal sanctions are now available when income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity is invested in any enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer, supra note 6, at 1290; Note, The Second Circuit Sedima
Trilogy: Judicial Impatience With Private Civil RICO, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1037, 1045 (1985)
(discussion of section 1962(a)-(c)).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1984). The statute provides that a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id.
Racketeering activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1984) to mean:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping [sic], gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dan-
gerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code: [bribery, sports bribery, counterfeiting,
theft from interstate shipment, embezzlement from pension or welfare funds, extor-
tionate credit transactions, transmission of gambling information, mail fraud, wire
fraud, obscene matter, obstruction of justice, obstruction of criminal investigations,
obstruction of State or local law enforcement, interference with commerce, robbery
or extortion, racketeering, interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, un-
lawful welfare fund payments, prohibition of illegal gambling businesses, interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles, interstate transportation of stolen property,
trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts, trafficking in contraband
cigarettes, white slave trafficking]; (C) any act which is indictable under title 29
United States Code section 186 [dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to
labor organizations or relating to embezzlement from union funds); (D) any offense
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities,
or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling,
or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law
of the United States, or (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and For-
eign Transactions Reporting Act. (citations ommitted).
Id.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1984).
"o See infra note 31.
3' See, e.g., Sun Savings & Loan v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987); Beck v. Man-
ufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987); Bank of America v. Touche
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of securities.3
II. Sedima: ABOLISHING COURT IMPOSED HURDLES?
In Sedima,33 the Second Circuit upheld the requirements of a
Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 583 F. Supp.
780 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D.C. Md. 1976).
The elements of mail and wire fraud are (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of the
mails or wires in furtherance of the scheme. See Freschi, 583 F. Supp. at 787 (such a RICO
claim should allege that defendants gave false information by mail and wire to defraud
plaintiff).
With respect to the first element, case law in the area indicates that any departure from
"fundamental honesty" or "fair play and candid dealings" is sufficient to consititute fraud.
United States v. Kriemer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1980) (scheme to be measured by
non-technical standard of fair play); United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224, 1229 (5th Cir.
1973) (fraud is scheme to "deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension"),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974). The use of the mails or wires is not difficult to establish.
See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954) (if mailing or wiring is foreseeable
defendant need not have actually mailed anything). Accord United States v. Young Bros.,
728 F.2d 682, 689 (5th Cir.) (court saw mailing as not only foreseeable, but did not see
necessity of determining a rigid time-frame for mailing; it was sufficient that mailing was in
the furtherance of the scheme), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, (1984); United States v. Shep-
herd, 511 F.2d 119, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1975) (if defendant uses the mails or wires, that use
need only be "incidental to an essential part" of the scheme). The facility with which these
predicate acts may be proved and the common use of such means of communication in
everyday business life would seem to explain the popularity of RICO suits involving mail
and wire fraud. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). "The single most significant reason for the expansive use of Civil RICO has
been the presence in the statute, as predicate acts, of mail and wire fraud violations." Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting)
Despite the integral part the mails play in business life, honest business persons need not
have concern as good-faith has always been a complete defense. See Durland v. United
States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) (if evidence had shown that the defendant acted in good
faith, "no conviction could be sustained"); United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485,
492 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).
13 See, e.g., Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 96 (D.C. Pa. 1983) (fraud in
sale of securities falls within RICO coverage); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (failure to adequately allege fraud precluded
plaintiff from claiming RICO violation); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 1278, 1282 (D. Del. 1978) (assignment of forged securities in mortgage scheme);
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., 1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,742 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (violation of reporting requirements). See generally Bridges, Pri-
vate RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud In the Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L. Rev. 43 (1983)
(discussing securities fraud as a predicate offense); Morrison, Old Bottle Not So New Wine:
Treble Damages in Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 10 SEQ REG. L.J. 67 (1982) (dis-
cussing RICO's influencing securities field).
A recent ruling by the Supreme Court, however, may make RICO securities-fraud cases
less attractive to plaintiffs. See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332
(1987). In McMahon, the Court ruled that RICO securities claims were arbitrable under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). Id. at 2333. Arbitration awards are less
generous as they do not include treble damages and attorneys' fees. Id.
U 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Sedima was a Belgian manu-
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prior conviction and a racketeering injury." On appeal, however,
the Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, 5 struck down those
restrictions," holding that "RICO is to be read broadly, '83 per-
haps even in "situations that were not contemplated by
Congress.""
The Court stated that the imposition of additional requirements
would emasculate the civil provisions and as a result, the remedial
purposes of RICO.8 ' Nevertheless, the Court, in a footnote, did
facturer of defense and aerospace equipment and the defendant was a New York firm in-
volved in the export of aviation equipment. Id. at 484. The two firms were involved in a
joint venture to supply parts to a European company. Id. Sedima charged that the defend-
ant had submitted fraudulently inflated bills. Id. at 484-85.
I d. at 503.
' 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens and
O'Connor comprised the majority. Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell
dissented. Id. As the Second Circuit was thought to have emasculated the private civil
RICO action, the Supreme Court decision "determined the fate of the private remedy at
the judicial level." Black, supra note 3, at 374. See also, Comment, The Second Circuit Rubs
Out Civil RICO: Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 59 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 398 (1985). Many
observers expected the Court to restrict civil RICO claims because of a reluctance to feder-
alize common law fraud. Id. However, the Court recognized civil RICO had evolved into
something different from what was envisioned by its enactors. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. But
the Court concluded that the "breadth" of the statute was not cause for courts to restrict
its application by creating "amorphous" standing requirements. Id. Indeed, it stated that
any revision should be left to Congress and the lower courts should eschew artificial restric-
tions and concentrate on the defendants' procedural protections. Id. at 499. The dissent,
however, reiterated the Second Circuit's conclusions that since Congress did not explicitly
consider an expansive use of civil RICO, it must not have intended such a result. Id. at 501
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
s Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-94. The Court stated that there were no indications to re-
quire a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to a civil RICO suit. Id. at 488. Furthermore,
legislative history was found to be contrary to such an interpretation. Id. at 489. In addi-
tion, the Court concluded that the suggested "prior conviction requirement would be in-
consistent with Congress' underlying policy concerns." Id. at 493.
t Id. at 498. The Court reasoned that the broad reading should be made in accordance
with Congress' "self-consciously expansive language and overall approach . Id.
" Id. at 499.
" Id. at 497. The Court collected much support for its position in both the language and
the history of RICO. Id. at 488-94. It was the expressed intent of Congress that "[tihe
provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id.
at 498 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 947 (1970)). See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 n.l I (1981)
(interpreting RICO's statement of purpose and congressional record to require a broad
construction). In particular, Congress emphasized benefits to plaintiffs by providing for a
liberal discovery process and a relaxed standard of proof in a civil action. See S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 82-82 (1969).
When enacting RICO, Congress was well aware that the treble damages provision might
attract frivolous litigation. Several legislators expressed concern that the broad language of
the statute was an "invitation for disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent
Pattern Requirement of Civil RICO
appear to suggest the potential use of the pattern requirement as
a means of limiting RICO suits. 0 The Court provided some guid-
ance by quoting from a relevant Senate Report:4'1 "[T]he factor of
continuity plus relationship combines to produce a pattern."', How-
ever, the Court did not provide for what should be the requisite
number of racketeering acts necessary to satisfy the "continuity"
factor. Furthermore, it failed to set forth what "relationship" the
acts must have with each other to constitute a pattern of racke-
teering activity.
In the same footnote, the Court hinted that the lower courts
may refer to the definition of pattern in the Dangerous Special
Offenders Act section 3575(e),'3 a part of the same Bill as RICO.
Although a number of circuit courts have entertained this invita-
tion," it is submitted that the Sedima Court did not suggest that
the definition was a panacea in determining whether a pattern ex-
ists under RICO. The fact that both RICO and section 3575(e)
were enacted simultaneously yet embodied different definitions
would seem to indicate that Congress intentionally chose to use
the term "pattern" differently in different contexts.'"
businessmen .... " H.R. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4083 (views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva and Ryan). Furthermore, it was
-stated that "what a protracted and expensive trial may not succeed in doing, the adverse
publicity may well accomplish ... ." Id. Representative Mikva went so far as to introduce
an unsuccessful amendment that would have allowed victims of frivolous private law suits
to recover treble damages. 116 CONG. REC. 35,342-43 (1970) (statement of Rep. Mikva).
The fact that the House defeated the amendment without discussion would tend to demon-
strate that it was well aware of the scope of RICO and that it moved quickly to prevent any
attempts to limit it.
"0 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. For full text of footnote 14, see supra note 16. Several
commentators agree that the Sedima Court's observations suggest to other courts that they
"develop a restrictive view of what a 'pattern' is ... Abrams, supra note 3, at 182. See
also Black, supra note 3, at 375.
"' Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
42 Id.
, 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1984). See supra note 16.
4" See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
"" See United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir. 1980) (Congress inten-
tionally chose to use term pattern in different contexts).
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III. LIMrrING CIVIL RICO AFTER Sedima: THE EIGHTH AND
TENTH CIRCUITS
It is submitted that the most restrictive interpretation of the
Sedima footnote is the one shared by the Eighth and Tenth Cir-
cuits. Both require plaintiffs to show not only two acts of racke-
teering activity, but also two or more separate schemes to prove
the requisite pattern."
Illustrative of this position is Superior Oil v. Fulmer," in which
the Eighth Circuit held that since the predicate acts were commit-
ted in furtherance of a single scheme, the pattern requirement
was not met." The defendant in Superior Oil was charged with
using the mails and wires to convert the plaintiff's natural gas
pipeline for his own use." Although the plaintiff proved related
acts of mail and wire fraud, the court ruled he failed to meet the
continuity requirement" because "[t]here was no proof that [de-
" See Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163, 1164 (8th Cir.) (appellants only alleged scheme
of keeping company afloat in order to "loot" it which did not amount to "pattern of racke-
teering" under RICO), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 86 (1987); Condict v. Condict, 815 F.2d 579,
583 (10th Cir. 1987) (fraud, deceit and use of mails and wires more than twice did not
establish "pattern of racketeering activity"); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 8 10 F.2d 925, 929
(10th Cir. 1987) (one scheme, one result, one set of participants, one victim, one method of
commission, thus no continuity and no "pattern of racketeering"); Deviries v. Prudential-
Bache Securities, Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (activities comprising supposed
"pattern" pertained soley to alleged misrepresentations in connection with plaintiffs ac-
count, and as there was no evidence that defendant had engaged in similar endeavors in
the past, the plaintiff failed to prove continuity); Superior Oil v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257
(8th Cir. 1986) (although alleged acts were sufficiently related to form a pattern, they con-
stituted mere subdivisions of only one fraudulent scheme and therefore lacked sufficient
continuity to form a "pattern of racketeering activity"). See also Ornest v. Delaware North
Cos., 818 F.2d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 1987) (single eight-year fraudulent scheme was not a
pattern); Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1986) (the fraudulent
letters of credit were one scheme and therefore not a pattern), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953
(1987).
47 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
" Id. at 257.
4' Id. at 253-54.
" Id. at 257. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985). The
Court noted that the legislative history of RICO seems to require continuity plus relation-
ship between the predicate acts. Id.
A pattern of racketeering requires at the barest minimum two 'acts of racketeering
activity.' 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). In general, however, much more than two such acts
must be shown in order to demonstrate a pattern .... The separate racketeering
acts must reflect both 'continuity' and 'relatedness' in order to constitute a pattern.
Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 323 (7th Cir. 1986). This requirement is not
easily met:
[TJhe terms 'continuity' and 'relationship' are somewhat at odds with one another.
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fendants] ha[d] ever done these activities in the past and there was
no proof that they were engaged in other criminal activities
elsewhere."'61
The Tenth Circuit adopted the multiple schemes requirement
in Torwest D.B.C., Inc. v. Dick,52 wherein they reiterated the rule
that to make an adequate showing of continuity the plaintiff must
demonstrate facts from which at least the threat of ongoing illegal
conduct can be inferred. The court held that a single scheme
Relationship implies that the predicate acts were committed somewhat closely in
time to one another, involve the same victim, or involve the same type of miscon-
duct. Continuity, on the other hand, would embrace predicate acts occurring at dif-
ferent points in time or involving different victims. To focus excessively on either
continuity or relationship alone effectively negates the remaining prong.
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Heritage Ins. Co.
of Am. v. First Nat'l Bank of Cicero, 629 F. Supp. 1412, 1416 (N.D. III. 1986)). Compare
Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant who for
nine consecutive months filed fraudulent state tax returns satisfied continuity and relation-
ship standards; each return represented separate fraud, and activity would have continued
indefinitely until detected) with Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347, 350 (7th
Cir. 1986) (alleged acts of mail fraud were not distinct, although committed over period of
several years, because they all related to plaintiffs' attempts to settle one claim under their
insurance policy, and acts therefore did not constitute pattern).
61 Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 257. The Eighth Circuit has since reaffirmed the multiple
schemes requirement. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953 (1987). Morrisette involved the submission of false documents in
order to draw on plaintiff's letter of credit. Id. at 207-08. The court reaffirmed its position
in Superior Oil and held that several related acts of mail and wire fraud as part of a single
scheme do not constitute a pattern. Id. at 209-10. See also Ornest v. Delaware North Cos.,
Inc., 818 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1987), where the defendant fraudulently falsified daily and
monthly gross receipts and reports in order to "skim" commissions from vending ma-
chines. Id. at 652. The court did not find a pattern although each falsified report could be
viewed as a separate predicate act. Id. Similarly, in Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 86 (1987), the defendants kited checks, diverted corporate
assets, including employees' vacation pay and United Way contributions, and defrauded
creditors through false financial statements. Id. at 1164. Despite the existence of multiple
predicate acts, the court declined to find "a pattern of racketeering activity" as it deemed
the acts to be mere subdivisions of a single fraudulent scheme. Id. Finally, in Deviries v.
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff contended
that during a six year period the defendant had "churned" his account by recommending
unsuitable investments. Id. at 327. The court ruled this constituted only a single scheme to
generate excessive sales commissions and, as such, failed to allege the continuity necessary
to establish a pattern. Id. at 329. Other circuits, such as the Seventh Circuit, would have
viewed each report as a separate predicate act, and thus would have found a pattern of
racketeering activity. See, e.g., Morgan, 804 F.2d at, 976.
" 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987). In Torwest, the corporation brought suit against its
former directors for secretly purchasing real estate and reselling it to the corporation at an
immediate secret profit of $1,250,000 and a potential additional profit of $6,000,000. Id.
at 926-27.
Id. at 928. "This element is derived from RICO's legislative history, which indicates
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did not create the requisite threat of ongoing activity."
The position of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits may be subject
to criticism in several ways. It is suggested that to require two sep-
arate schemes violates the textual and legislative intent of RICO
and also ignores the broad holding in Sedima."
RICO defines "racketeering activity" as an "act," specifically as
any of the state or federal offenses enumerated in section
1961(1)." "The phrase 'pattern of racketeering activity' is thus
properly read as a pattern of 'acts,' not a pattern of 'schemes' or
'activities' " as the Eighth and Tenth Circuits would hold.7 Ar-
guably, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have placed too much em-
phasis on the "continuity" requirement by requiring that the
racketeering acts occur in multiple schemes. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted, that the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, in their attempt to
limit civil RICO suits have stretched the statutory language be-
yond its reasonable limits.
Congress passed RICO to combat activities which "harm[ed] in-
nocent investors and competing organizations, interfer[ed] with
free competition . . . [and] threaten[ed] the domestic security.""
Such activities can be as easily conducted through a single scheme
that RICO does not apply to 'sporadic activity' or to the 'isolated offender.' " Id. at 928
(citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14). See also Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810,
818 (7th Cir. 1987) (allegedly fraudulent representations leading to single contract and
transfer of single business opportunity were not a pattern).
" Torwest, 810 F.2d at 929. See Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir.
1986) (act to defraud one victim one time insufficient in absence of showing of other vic-
tims or other frauds); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 628 F. Supp. 163, 165-66 (D. Colo.
1986) (one scheme, one result, one set of participants, one victim, one method of commis-
sion, thus no continuity and no pattern of racketeering), affd,. 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.
1987).
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its position in Condict v. Condict, 815 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.
1987). There, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants used the mails and wires to
acquire the plaintiff's interest in the family ranch. Id. at 580-82. The court relied on Supe-
rior Oil and Torwest and ruled that the plaintiff must show more than a single scheme. Id. at
583-85.
"See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 28 (for list of predicate acts under RICO).
'" Moran, The Meaning of Pattern in RICO, 62 CH[-]KENT L. REv. 139, 155 (1986). Moran
emphasizes that "[n]othing in the text of RICO supports this requirement of multiple
schemes." Id. at 156. RICO expressly requires "at least two acts of racketeering activity"
not "at least two criminal schemes or episodes." Id. at 156 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)
(1982)).
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
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as a multiple one. 9 To require two or more schemes allows de-
fendants who commit large single schemes to circumvent RICO
liability.10 For instance, where a single scheme involves several of
the predicate acts enumerated in RICO the multiple scheme ap-
proach would nevertheless find no RICO violation."' Such a posi-
tion undermines the remedial purpose of RICO" and ignores the
plight of that broad class of victims Congress sought to protect.'8
' See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986). The Morgan
court stated:
[Tihe proposition that the predicate acts must always occur as part of separate
schemes in order to satisfy the continuity aspect of the pattern requirement focuses
excessively on continuity, and therefore cannot be accepted as a general rule. Other-
wise defendants who commit a large and ongoing scheme, albeit a single scheme,
would automatically escape RICO liability for their acts, an untenable result.
Id.
' See Moran, supra note 57, at 156 n.lll.
S Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496. Congress mandated that RICO be "liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 498 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. at 947). For an analysis of how courts have
interpreted this proposition, see generally Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980).
" See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd,
730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984). Liebowitz demonstrates how a non-multiple scheme application
of RICO can remedy illegal activities Congress sought to prevent. Id. The defendant, Stu-
art Liebowitz, conducted a widespread mail fraud scheme in which he diverted for his own
use premium money properly owed to the insurers. Id. at 906. Despite the efforts of the
New York State Insurance Department and Aetna, Liebowitz continued the diversion of
funds and caused an estimated loss of between four and six million dollars. Id. In his discus-
sion of Liebowitz, one commentator stated that only when Aetna filed a civil RICO suit and
the district judge granted a preliminary injunction was the defendant estopped from fur-
ther diversion of funds. Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some Maturational Problems and
Proposals for Reform, 35 RuTGERS L. REV. 285, 287-88 (1983). The same commentator sug-
gested that had it not been for the civil RICO action, the defendant would have success-
fully continued to avoid sanctions. Id. at 310-11.
Civil RICO is valuable to such plaintiffs because it reaches both legitimate and illegiti-
mate enterprises. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589-93 (1981). See also
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) (exempting illegal enterprises
from RICO would leave a loophole), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 3, at 1023-25 (discussion of the nature of "enterprise" under RICO). In Sedima,
the Court reminded us that legitimate enterprises "enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for
criminal activity nor an immunity from its consequences." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499. The
inclusion of the words "Organized Crime" in the title of the act has caused many to
wrongly associate organized crime with traditional criminal groups such as La Cosa Nostra.
Blakey, supra note 2, at 250 n.40. This position was criticized by the sponsor of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act, Senator John L. McClellan: "[I]n none of the hearings or in the
processing of legislation in which I have been involved has [organized crime] been used in.
. . [such a] circumscribed fashion." Id. (citing GAMBLING IN AMER cA: A REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF NATIONAL PoLicY TOWARD GAMBLING 181-82 (1976)).
The Second Circuit noted:
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It is further submitted that the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have
substantially transcended the possible limits of the interpretation
of "pattern" suggested by the Court in Sedima. It is noteworthy in
this regard, that two judges of the Eighth Circuit have suggested
that the "multiple schemes" requirement be re-examined en banc
when a proper case presents itself."
IV. Two RELATED ACTS ARE SUFFICIENT
Although a majority of the circuit courts are in agreement with
the proposition that a "multiple schemes" approach" is not the
most appropriate analysis, they have nevertheless diverged in their
analyses of what approach to take in determining a pattern." It is
The fact that the alleged perpetrators are presumably respectable and entrusted
with responsibility . . . by stockholders does not suggest . . . that they are incapable
of engaging in organized criminal activity. We all stand equal before the bar of crim-
inal justice, and the wearing of a white collar, even though it is starched, does not
preclude the organized pursuit of unlawful profit.
United States v. Carter, 493 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1974). The purpose of the civil reme-
dies is "to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains." Turkette, 452 U.S. at
585.
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1987).
" See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 68-69, 99 and accompanying text (Ninth, Eleventh and Second Circuit
pattern approaches). Cf. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986). In
Morgan, the Seventh Circuit announced that "[i]n order to be sufficiently continuous to
constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, the predicate acts must be ongoing over an
identified period of time so that they can fairly be viewed as constituting separate transac-
tions, i.e., 'transactions somewhat separate in time and place.' Id. at 975 (emphasis added)
(citing Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (quoting United States
v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975)). See also Skycom Corp. v. Telstar
Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 1987) (supposedly fraudulent representations leading
up to single contract and the transfer of a single business opportunity did not constitute
pattern); Marks v. Pannell Kerr Forster, 811 F.2d 1108, 1111 (7th Cir. 1987) (racketeering
acts defrauded one victim, on one occasion and acts alleged, while multiple, represented
the entire scheme which would necessarily end after its single accomplishment, and there-
fore did not establish pattern of racketeering).
The Morgan court further asserted that in determining whether a pattern was estab-
lished, the "[rielevant factors include the number and variety of predicate acts and the
length of time over which they were committed, the number of victims, the presence of
separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries." Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975. How-
ever, the court stressed that even if the predicate acts related to the same overall scheme,
this did not automatically mean failure of the pattern requirement. Id. at 975-76. Accord
Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 1986). The application of
these relevant factors are to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis since the "doctrinal re-
quirement of a pattern of racketeering activity is a standard, not a rule, and as such its
determination depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, with no one
factor being necessarily determinative." Morgan, 804 F.2d at 976. Applying this analysis,
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suggested that the two related acts analysis adopted by the Ninth,
Eleventh and Second Circuits most approximates Congress' and
the Sedima Court's intent. It is further suggested that the best ap-
proach is that enunciated by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Ianniello,7 which looks more specifically to the enterprise compo-
nent in relation to the predicate acts in determining whether a
pattern of racketeering activity exists.
A. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
On the opposite end of the spectrum of the pattern interpreta-
tive scale are the Ninth" and Eleventh" Circuits. Rather than re-
quiring multiple schemes, each circuit requires only two related
acts to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity.70
the Morgan court found that a pattern of racketeering did exist under its facts since the
alleged acts of mail fraud, which extended over several years, resulted in two separate and
distinct foreclosure sales held within two years of each other. Id.
Conversely, the same court was unwilling to find a pattern in Marks, where "[tihe multi-
ple predicate acts covered a short period of time (several months) and [did] not take on the
character of being separate and distinct schemes in time and place." Marks, 811 F.2d at
1112.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, that under the Seventh Circuit's transactional
analysis, the presence of more victims, more predicate acts and distinct injuries inflicted
over a longer period of time, will more likely result in a finding of pattern. Nevertheless, at
least two separate transactions are required. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
It is further submitted that such requirements provide a vague and unpredictable rule of
decision. The court in Morgan recognized that such a legal test is "less than precise." Mor-
gan, 804 F.2d at 977. Moreover, the court accepted that the test that would be developed
on a case-by-case basis. Id.
For a case where the Seventh Circuit was unwilling to to find the continuity requirement
satisfied, see Skycom, 813 F.2d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 1987), wherein allegedly fraudulent repre-
sentations leading to single contract and transfer of single business opportunity did not
meet the continuity requirement. Id. See also Marks, 811 F.2d at 1112 (multiple predicate
acts covered shorter period of time and did not take the character of separate and distinct
transactions); Elliott, 809 F.2d at 350 (several acts of mail fraud over a period of several
years not distinct since related to one settlement claim).
e7 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986). See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
s See, e.g., Sun Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987); Califor-
nia Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th
Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs' allegations of "at least twenty-four separate acts of mail and wire
fraud" amounted to pattern), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v.
Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (district court erred in re-
quiring plaintiffs to allege a connection to organized crime and a separate racketeering
activity).
" See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966
(1 th Cir. 1986) (multiple schemes not required to establish a pattern); Robison v. Via, 636
F. Supp. 268 (D. Vt. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 821 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
"* See infra notes 81 & 91 and accompanying text.
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1. Threat of Continuing Activity
Representative of this position is Bank of America v. Touche Ross
& Co.," in which the Eleventh Circuit was confronted with a civil
RICO claim72 concerning a suit brought by five banks against a
public accounting firm.78 After reviewing the financial documents
prepared by the defendant, 74 the banks agreed to extend credit7 '
to International Horizons." Subsequently, International Horizons
filed for bankruptcy"7 and the banks sought to recover from the
defendant alleging nine separate acts of wire and mail fraud78 in-
volving the same parties over a three year period.7 '
The Touche Ross court denounced any requirement that the
predicate acts must occur within different criminal episodes or
multiple schemes'0 and concluded that it was necessary to show
" 782 F.2d at 966.
"Id. at 968. The banks alleged that the defendants violated section 1962(c) and (d)
which provide:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to con-
duct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d) (1982). Therefore, under RICO's definitional framework, the de-
fendants were "persons" employed by or associated with International Horizons, an "en-
terprise" engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. The banks suffered injury as a re-
sult of defendants' "direct or indirect participation in the conduct" of International
Horizon's affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activity" (specifically, two or more acts
of mail fraud and wire fraud). Touche Ross, 782 F.2d at 969.
'a Touche Ross, 782 F.2d at 968.
7" Id. These financial documents were prepared as a prerequisite to execution of the
credit agreement to International Horizons. Id. The documents took the form of audited
financial statements and unqualified reports. Id.
78 Id. The agreement executed extended $60 million in credit to International Horizons.
Id.
." Id.
'17 Id. International Horizons filed for bankruptcy two years after the financial agree-
ment was signed. Id.
7 Id. "During the course of the bankruptcy litigation, the banks entered into a settle-
ment with International Horizons that resulted in a loss to the banks of approximately
$16.7 million in unpaid loans and legal expenses." Id. Therefore, the banks brought suit
against defendant accountants for the outstanding damages. Id.
The court stated that the bank's complaint which alleged only one instance of mail fraud
was not deficient because on seven other occasions it was alleged that the defendants pre-
pared false financial statements and reports that they knew would ultimately be mailed to
the banks. Id. at 971.
79 Id.
" Id. In interpreting Sedima, the court stated that "[aicts that are part of the same
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more than one predicate act plus the threat of continuing activity
to satisfy the continuity component of Sedima.8" The court found
that the complaint before them was sufficient on the basis of the
following factors: the relationship between the parties, the time
frame of the predicate acts, and the number of predicate acts.82
The court held that each act which is a separate violation of a
statute will be considered distinct from other acts violating the
same statute regardless of the underlying circumstances. 83 It is
submitted, however, that the Eleventh Circuit's exclusive reliance
on the definition of pattern set forth in section 3575(e)" in deter-
mining whether a RICO pattern is established places too much
emphasis on the relationship of the acts without providing a
method for determining continuity.
A Georgia district court applying this standard held that a
showing of two predicate acts as part of a single scheme was suffi-
cient to meet the threshold burden under Touche Ross.88 Never-
theless, a single bond offering to thousands of investors did not
demonstrate the continuing and ongoing design necessary to
establish a "threat of continuing activity.""
Although it is conceded that such Eleventh Circuit analysis is
consistent with both the language in RICO and in Sedima, there
scheme or transaction can qualify as distinct predicate acts" and as such each act will be a




Id. Rather, the court looked to section 3575(e) as an aid in determining the pattern
requirement. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. This definition looks to the
similarity or interrelatedness of the acts rather than considering whether there is a threat
of the acts continuing in the future. Touche Ross, 782 F.2d at 971.
Sheftelman v. Jones, 636 F. Supp. 263, 268 (N.D. Ga. 1986). The court followed
Touche Ross and determined that the predicate acts did not constitute a threat of continuity,
since they did not occur over a protracted period of time, nor were there frequent solicita-
tions made to a small group. Id. at 268. The threshold burden of alleging two predicate
acts was met even though only one scheme was involved. Id. But see Bros v. Culver, 650 F.
Supp. 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987). That court interpreted the Eleventh Circuit as stating that a
RICO case could not be dismissed as long as separate violations are alleged. Id. at 876. In
Bros, the acts were part of a single transaction, all designed to execute one scheme. d. at
877. Touche Ross did not go so far as to say facts like these definitely state a cause of action
under RICO. Id. The court concluded that an adoption of the Touch, Ross approach would
be unduly broad in light of the facts of this case and the purpose of RICO. Id. at 876.
" Sheftelan, 636 F. Supp. at 268. The court distinguished this conduct from that in
Touch Ross as not occurring over a protracted time period. Id.
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remains the circuit's failure to enunciate a clear test for determin-
ing when a "threat of continuing activity" exists. As the Georgia
case demonstrates," the lack of a clear test will result in defend-
ants escaping RICO liability in situations which Congress clearly
intended to remedy.
2. Acts Which Are Not Isolated or Sporadic
The Ninth Circuit has also interpreted RICO as only requiring
a single criminal scheme." In Sun Savings and Loan Association v.
Dierdorff89 the court rejected the requirement of multiple
schemes as unreasonably limiting the scope of RICO and over-
looking the admonition of the Supreme Court to read RICO
broadly." A showing of "two or more predicate acts that are not
isolated events, are separate in time, and in furtherance of a single
criminal scheme" was held sufficient to satisfy the pattern
requirement. 91
The "threat of continuing activity" requirement is met quite
simply if the acts are not isolated or sporadic." There is no need
to show that the activity will continue to exist in the future, but
only that the "threat of continuing activity" existed at some time
'7 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
Sun Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987). The
court was clear in its rejection of the multiple schemes approach: "We see no sound basis
for the view taken by some courts that a pattern requires more than one 'fraudulent
scheme' or 'criminal episode'." Id. The alleged racketeering activity consisted of four let-
ters written by Dierdorff (Sun Savings' former president) to various entities. Id. at 189.
Dierdorff allegedly wrote the letters to cover up a scheme in which he received kickbacks
from Sun's loan customers. Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 187.
68 Id. at 193, n.4. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497. But see Medallion TV Enter. v. SelecTV,
Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (separate criminal episodes unconnected in
time and substance are necessary to show pattern of racketeering), affd, 823 F.2d 1390
(9th Cir. 1987).
91 Dierdorff, 825 F.2d at 193.
" Id. at 194. Cf Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1393
(9th Cir. 1986). The Dierdorff court distinguished Schreiber on its facts by noting that in
that case, the four predicate acts were part of a "series" of on-going criminal activities.
Dierdorff, 825 F.2d at 194. Two predicate acts, occurring at nearly the same time and relat-
ing to the single goal of diverting a single shipment, were held not to constitute a threat of
continuing activity because there was no further need to commit predicate acts once the
goal was completed. Id. The Dierdorff court failed to distinguish the difference between
"goal" and "scheme", or indicate how much time must pass between predicate acts before
the pattern requirement is met. Id.
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during the activity.98 Applying this analysis to the facts in
Dierdorff, the court held that four separate acts over a five-month
period (which acts did not complete the criminal scheme) did meet
the pattern requirement. "
The Ninth Circuit's approach does extinguish the potential gap
between congressional intent to redress civil RICO victims and
the Eleventh Circuit's misapplication of the "threat of continuing
activity" prong by explicitly eliminating the need to show that the
activity will continue to exist in the future. Even this approach,
however, does not fully implement Congress' intent in that it fails
to give proper respect to the enterprise component of RICO.
RICO was designed to ensure that the predicate acts it covers are
not isolated or sporadic since it provided that they be done in the
conduct of the affairs of an enterprise. It is submitted that the
enterprise component, by its very ongoing nature, satisfies the
Ninth Circuit's requirement that the acts are not isolated or spo-
radic, while supplying the unifying link in determining whether
the alleged predicate acts constitute a pattern of racketeering
activity.
B. The Second Circuit: Pre-Sedima Civil RICO Analysis Survives
1. "Enterprise" as a Means of Finding Pattern
The Second Circuit, prior to Sedima, held that two or more
predicate acts constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. In
United States v. Parness,95 the court of appeals held that a pattern
of racketeering activity could be established by any two predicate
acts, even if the acts occurred on the same day, in the same place,
and as part of the same criminal episode." In United States v. Weis-
man,9' the Second Circuit left the pattern requirement of Parness
" Dierdorff, 825 F.2d at 194 n.5.
" Id. at 190, 194.
503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
"Id. at 438. See also United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(court ruled defrauding single victim through six acts of wire fraud was pattern); United
States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58 (D. Conn. 1975) (two acts of interstate transporta-
tion of stolen property on the same day formed pattern of racketeering activity).
n 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980). The Weisman case chroni-
cled the tale of the Westchester Premier Theatre. Elliot Weisman and his co-defendants
conducted a fraudulent stock offering in order to raise the two million dollars needed to
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unaltered, 98 but it chose to focus on the enterprise requirement as
a means of establishing continuity between the predicate acts and
the "pattern of racketeering activity.""
In its first case after Sedima, the Second Circuit in United States
v. Ianniello,'0 0 held that the carefully reasoned analysis of Weisman
was not overruled by the Sedima footnote.10' The court continued
to examine the "enterprise" to determine whether the relatedness
requirement was fulfilled.10 Pursuant to the Second Circuit's
analysis, an enterprise must be a continuing operation and the
predicate acts must be related to the common purpose of the en-
terprise. 08 An enterprise with only a single purpose can qualify as
the basis for a RICO violation'04 when two or more predicate acts
construct the theater. Id. at 1120. To assure that the minimum number of shares were
purchased at the public offering, they arranged to make cash payoffs from the theater's
profits to those who purchased stock. Id. Once the theater was operating, Weisman and his
associates began to skim and divert to their own use the earnings from ticket sales and
concessions. Id. Even when the skimming forced the theater into Chapter XI bankruptcy
proceedings, they continued their skimming. Id. at 1121. Weisman was eventually con-
victed of nine counts of securities fraud and nine counts of bankruptcy fraud. Brodsky,
"Pattern Requirement Under RICO", N.Y.L.J. Sept. 9, 1987, at 2, col. 1.
" See Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1125 (applying "any two" predicate acts rule and citing Par-
ness with approval). See also Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y. of United States v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 627 F. Supp. 1023, 1027-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying Weisman after Sedima).
" Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1122. The court noted that the language of the Act did not
expressly require the predicate acts to be related and that the legislative history was found
to be inconclusive. Id. at 1122 n.3. See United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 544 (5th
Cir.) (government must prove relation between predicate offenses and affairs of enterprise
to meet "pattern of racketeering" requirement), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982); United
States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (two predicate acts need not be
related to each other, but they must be related to the enterprise), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1136 and 459 U.S. 906 (1982).
'-0 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986). lanniello involved a scheme in which money was
skimmed from several well known Manhattan restaurants. Id. at 187.
101 Id. at 190. The footnote language regarding pattern was distinguished as mere dicta
and, therefore, not controlling. Id.
I" Id. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496
n.14.
10 lanniello, 808 F.2d at 191.
' Id. The court noted that some cases have drawn the line where the crimes were
"aimed at a discrete goal, singular in time and in instance." Id. See Professional Assets
Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., 616 F. Supp. 1418, 1420-22 (W.D. Okla.
1985) (crimes to further goal of fraudulently preparing a single audit report did not form a
pattern). Apparently, the court is saying that the single purpose necessary for an enterprise
to be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) must be engaged in a course of conduct. lanniello,
808 F.2d at 191. This "is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or infor-
mal, and by evidence that the various associations function as a continuing unit." Id. (quot-
ing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).
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have been committed in order to further the enterprise. There-
fore, "when a person commits at least two acts that have the com-
mon purpose of furthering a criminal enterprise ... the elements
of relatedness and continuity which the Sedima footnote construes
section 1962(c) to include are satisfied."' 05 It is submitted that the
analytical approach taken by the Second Circuit in Weisman and
lanniello strikes the ideal balance between the competing interests
of plaintiffs and defendants while avoiding many of the disadvan-
tages of the other circuits' analyses, as discussed above.
The Second Circuit's requirement of continuity as an element
of "enterprise" is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Turkette,1 " where the Court ruled that en-
terprise is "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal
or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function
as a continuing unit."10 It is submitted that there is no inconsis-
,tency between the requirement of continuity for an enterprise,
recognized in Turkette and in the decisions of the Second Circuit,
and the requirement of continuity in pattern, recognized in the
Sedima footnote. In addition, focusing on the enterprise in deter-
mining a pattern and allowing claims of repeated criminal activity
in the course of a single scheme to be punished reflects the plain
language of RICO while it also tends to discourage claims based
solely upon isolated or sporadic activity. 8
2. Aberration in the Second Circuit's Pattern Approach
Although the Second Circuit reaffirmed its position that two re-
lated predicate acts are sufficient to establish a pattern under
RICO in Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,' °" the court
noted that the requisite continuity and relatedness could be found
10 Ianniello, 808 F.2d at 192.
1" 452 U.S. at 583 (1981).
1 7 Id.
I" Moran, supra note 57, at 150:
The required relationship is reflected instead, in the connection of the Acts to the
goal or purpose of the scheme. This relationship not only comports well with the
practical realities involved in the perpetuation of a criminal scheme, but also takes
into account the congressional intent that RICO not be directed to isolated or unre-
lated instances of prohibited behavior.
Id.Joe 820 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988).
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by examining either the pattern or the enterprise,' and the dif-
ference between the two was only "a matter of form"."' This is a
significant departure from Janniello."' The Beck court defined en-
terprise as the racketeering activity engaged in by the defendants," 8
rather than what RICO describes as the organizational vehicle by or
through which the racketeering activity is undertaken."' It is sub-
mitted that the Beck court's definition is contrary to the plain lan-
guage of RICO which makes it clear that enterprise is a separate
entity from racketeering activity." 5 By equating enterprise with
pattern of racketeering activity and then demanding that the
plaintiffs prove multiple episodes in order to make the enterprise
a continuing enterprise, Beck has attempted to reintroduce the
multiple episode approach that Janniello effectively eliminated.116
It is further submitted that both the Turkette Court and the Ian-
niello court recognized that continuity and relatedness are to be
found not in the pattern of acts but in the enterprise."'
The court further deviated from its earlier position in Janniello
in Furman v. Cirrito."18 The plaintiff there stated two state law
causes of action based on partnership fraud and breach of fiduci-
ary duty, and a cause of action under RICO." Since the actions
of the defendant partners in attempting to dispose of the partner-
ship were undertaken while the partnership was "not functioning
as a continuing unit in an ongoing organization,"'"0 the court
110 Id.
I" Id. (citation omitted). The court found that the defendants' enterprise had only one
goal, and that an association of this type was "not sufficiently continuing" so as to consti-
tute a RICO enterprise. Id.
112 Compare lanniello, 808 F.2d at 191 ("inquiry as to relatedness and continuity is best
addressed in the context of the concept of 'enterprise' ") with Beck, 820 F.2d at 51 (lannielo
recognized that to examine the enterprise or the pattern is a matter of form).
110 Beck, 820 F.2d at 51.
114 Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 908 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting).
110 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) ("The 'enterprise' is not the
'pattern of racketeering activity', it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of
activity in which it engages."); lanello, 808 F.2d at 190. ("[R]elatedness is supplied by the
concept of 'enterprise' . . . . This also supplies the necessary element of continuity since the
enterprise is a continuing operation.").
" Furman, 828 F.2d at 908 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
117 See supra note 111.
110 828 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1987).
119 Id. at 899.
100 Id. at 903.
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held that the continuity requirement was not satisfied.1 21
It is contended that the Furman court's analysis in determining
whether an enterprise existed was misplaced. In effect, the court
proposed that if the acts of the defendant put an end to the enter-
prise, no RICO liability should exist. It is very unlikely that Con-
gress and the Supreme Court had any intention of leaving such an
injury unremedied.
The Second Circuit's recent decisions in Beck and Furman have
shifted the focus away from the enterprise and back to the multi-
ple episode element.122 For example, if a plaintiff claims that he
has been defrauded through mail and wire fraud, both predicate
acts under RICO, the Weisman and Ianniello court would examine
the scheme to determine whether an enterprise existed.1 23 If so,
the continuity plus relationship requirement of Sedima would be
deemed satisfied.' The Beck and Furman court, however, might
look to see if the enterprise had a multiple scheme or a limited life
expectancy." 5 This approach would appear to be closer to that
taken by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and, therefore, it fails
for the very same reasons discussed above.
CONCLUSION
Congress has eagerly seized on the Sedima Court's suggestion
that they act to limit RICO suits," 6 however, no RICO amend-
" Id. Is the court really stating that an association whose purpose is to put an enterprise
out of business cannot be guilty of a RICO charge regardless of how many predicate acts
are done or over what period of time they are done? Id. at 908. (Pratt, J., dissenting). The
court indicated its discontent with plaintiffs' claims. Id. It expressed "difficulty in discover-
ing a sufficient allegation of racketeering activity at all" and "look[ed] with a jaundiced eye
upon allegations of fraud based on information and belief...." Id. A contention of coer-
cion was held "too conclusory to support a charge of criminal wrongdoing .. I.. "d  at
902. But see Furman, 828 F.2d at 903-04 (Pratt, J., dissenting). The majority's opinion nar-
rowly defined RICO despite the mandate of Congress and the Supreme Court. Id. This
decision, along with that of Beck, has made the "pattern" requirement into a maze with two
opposite exits. Id. at 908-09 (citing string of cases either limiting or applying lanniello).
in Furman, 828 F.2d at 908 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
" See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
124 Id.
1w Id.
"' See H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). This bill directly addresses the pattern
issue. Id. The bill introduced by Representative Conyers (D. Mich.) would amend § 1961(5)
to read: "(5) pattern of criminal activity means two or more acts of predicate criminal
activity, separate in time and place ... (c) that are interrelated by a common scheme, plan,
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ment to this end has yet been passed. Therefore, it is urged that
in any future RICO case before the Supreme Court, the Weisman
and Janniello approach of focusing on the enterprise element be
adopted to determine whether a pattern of racketeering activity
exists. This approach best fulfills Congress' promise of powerful
new remedies under RICO while protecting the rights of potential
defendants.
Aaron M. Oser & Kathleen B. Browne
or motive, and are not isolated events . Id.
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